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First Amendment theory and doctrine apply in distinctive ways
in the context of professional speech. Within the professionalclient relationship, the law constrains professionals in various
ways. Professionals are subject to licensing and malpractice
regimes. They have fiduciary duties to their clients or patients.
Because clients and patients seek professional advice in order to
access knowledge they lack but need to make important
decisions, professional advice must be comprehensive and
accurate according to the insights of the relevant professional
knowledge community. And dispensing professional advice
within the professional-client relationship ought to remain free
from state interference that seeks to prescribe its content in a way
that contradicts professional knowledge.
Implicit in the professional speech story are themes of sex,
gender, sexual orientation, and religion. Much of professional
speech doctrine in the courts has most recently developed around
conversion therapy laws and legislation concerning reproductive
rights. In part due to continued contestation surrounding these
issues, the development of professional speech doctrine has been
uneven and still lacks theoretical coherence. This Article charts
the sites of conflict that typically arise in the professional context,
and further unpacks how professional speech theory and
doctrine apply in likely future conflicts around reproductive
rights and transgender healthcare.
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INTRODUCTION
Navigating the First Amendment universe through a lens
of professional speech yields a perspective in which standard
theory and doctrine apply in distinctive ways. 1 When
professionals speak to their clients to give professional advice
within the confines of a professional-client relationship, the law
in many ways constrains what they may say. Professionals who
give bad advice are subject to malpractice liability, and the First
Amendment provides no defense; this creates liability for some
forms of “false speech,” unknown in other areas of speech
protected by the First Amendment. 2 Professionals have fiduciary
duties to their clients; such duties between speakers do not exist
elsewhere in First Amendment doctrine. 3 And the state may
require professionals to obtain a license before they dispense
advice; a similar requirement outside the context of a
professional-client relationship would likely be an impermissible
prior restraint. 4
Clients and patients seek professional advice in order to
access knowledge they lack but need to make important
decisions. To that end, professional advice must be
comprehensive and accurate, and must reflect the insights of the
relevant professional knowledge community. 5 Moreover,
1

See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016)
[hereinafter Haupt, Professional Speech].
2
Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 671, 682 (2017)
[hereinafter Haupt, Unprofessional Advice]; Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 949
(2007). Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that false ideas are
not unprotected under the First Amendment).
3
See Claudia E. Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE L.J. F. 185, 191
(2018) [hereinafter Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech].
4
See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3151985 [hereinafter Haupt, Licensing Knowledge].
5
Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 676 (discussing “the range of valid
professional knowledge for First Amendment purposes”).
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dispensing professional advice within the professional-client
relationship ought to remain free from state interference that
seeks to prescribe its content in a way that contradicts
professional knowledge, and I have previously argued that the
First Amendment provides a shield against such state
interference. 6
Implicit in the development of professional speech theory
and doctrine are themes of sex, gender, sexual orientation, and
religion. This Article aims to foreground these themes, chart the
sites of conflict that typically arise in the professional context,
and further unpack how professional speech theory and doctrine
cash out in likely future conflicts around reproductive rights and
transgender healthcare. Much of professional speech doctrine in
the courts has most recently developed around conversion
therapy laws 7 and legislation concerning reproductive rights. 8
Because these issues remain contested, the development of
professional speech doctrine in the courts has been uneven and
still lacks a coherent theoretical basis. I have suggested elsewhere
that the professions are best conceptualized as knowledge
communities and have proposed a theory of First Amendment
protection of professional speech based on this understanding. 9
This discussion builds on that theory.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the
emergence of professional speech—implicitly in the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and explicitly in the federal
appellate courts—drawing out the themes of sex, gender, sexual
orientation, and religion as they have surfaced in these cases.
Part II examines the tensions arising in the professional
context from the perspective of the profession. I first illustrate the
dynamic of outward resistance against state interference with
professional insights. Such interference is likely based on
justifications that are not part of the profession’s shared
knowledge basis, as most prominently displayed in the
reproductive health context. Then, I turn to internal contestation
within the professions and consider which role—if any—the
6

Id. at 673.
See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) and King v. Governor of N.J.,
767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (both upholding laws prohibiting sexual orientation
change efforts by licensed mental health providers for minors).
8
See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2015); Planned Parenthood
of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). See also Nat’l Inst. of
Family and Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom.
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). For
greater clarity and readability, Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Harris is
hereinafter shortened as “Harris” in citations, and Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates
v. Becerra is shortened as “Becerra.”
9
Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1241–42.
7
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state should play in resolving contested matters. Finally, the
discussion shifts to the client’s or patient’s perspective to
illustrate how professional knowledge is ultimately conveyed,
and what tensions in the professional-client (or doctor-patient)
relationship result from state interference.
Part III takes the view of the individual professional
seeking to depart from the consensus of the knowledge
community. I have suggested that these individual professionals
can be divided into internal and external outliers. 10 First, I
describe the different ways in which professional outliers depart
from the knowledge community’s consensus. The key distinction
is between those professionals who depart from professional
consensus but base their advice on a shared methodology of the
profession and those who depart from professional knowledge
due to exogeneous—most likely religious, philosophical, or
political—disagreement. Then, I examine ways in which the
state endorses or reinforces professionals’ outlier status. Finally,
here, too, I shift to the client’s or patient’s perspective, illustrating
how the individual professional’s outlier status affects advicegiving.
Part IV identifies two likely sites of future conflict,
namely the continuing struggle over access to comprehensive
reproductive health services and the emergent contestation
surrounding transgender healthcare. It then maps the application
of professional speech theory and doctrine in those areas.
“For more than two centuries,” as Geoffrey Stone
explains, “Americans have fought divisive social, political, and
constitutional battles over laws regulating sex, obscenity,
contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and same-sex marriage.
These conflicts have been divisive in no small part because of the
central role religion has played in shaping our laws governing
sex.” 11 Several of these themes, and the tensions they contain,
converge in professional speech, resulting in questions as to the
appropriate basis for giving professional advice, and the

10
11

See Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 676.
GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2017).
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availability of professional services 12—including, crucially,
healthcare services—to the public. 13
I. PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND THEORY
Landmark cases in the doctrinal history of professional
speech are Rust v. Sullivan, 14 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 15 and National Institute of Family & Life
Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra 16 in the Supreme Court, as well as
several reproductive rights and conversion therapy cases in the
federal appellate courts. 17 This Part examines those cases, and
their role in the development of professional speech, more
closely.
A. Reproductive Rights Cases
The starting point in the professional speech canon
involving access to reproductive healthcare is the Supreme
Court’s 1991 decision in Rust v. Sullivan. 18 Under federal
regulations, recipients of certain government funding were
prohibited from giving advice on abortion, and providers were
further prohibited from referring patients to abortion providers.
The Court upheld these limits upon professionals as consistent
with the First Amendment. The majority opinion’s framing of
Rust as a case about selective government funding, however,
concealed the true nature of the issue as one of professional
speech. 19 Justice Blackmun’s dissent makes the professional
dimension clear in its reference not only to “the legitimate
expectations of the patient,” but also “the ethical responsibilities
12
In the legal context, see, e.g., Bill Piatt, Opting Out in the Name of God: Will Lawyers
Be Compelled to Handle Same-Sex Divorces?, 79 ALB. L. REV. 683 (2016). See also
Claudia E. Haupt, Antidiscrimination in the Legal Profession and the First Amendment: A
Partial Defense of Model Rule 8.4(g), 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE (2016).
13
See Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 678; Claudia E. Haupt, Religious
Outliers: Professional Knowledge Communities, Individual Conscience Claims, and the
Availability of Professional Services to the Public, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE
UNITED STATES 173 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper
eds., 2017) [hereinafter Haupt, Religious Outliers]; Claudia E. Haupt, Professional
Ethics, Personal Conscience, and Public Expectations, 27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 233 (2016).
14
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
15
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
17
See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2015); Pickup v. Brown, 740
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014);
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012).
See also Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir.
2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361 (2018).
18
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
19
Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 683; Haupt, Professional Speech, supra
note 1, at 1260.
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of the medical profession.” 20 Irrespective of funding, the
argument goes, the patient and the profession demand that the
professional provide comprehensive advice. 21
It is instructive to read Rust alongside Legal Services
Corporation v. Velazquez:22 whereas the Court held the government
funding scheme’s limits on abortion counseling to be
constitutional under the First Amendment, it held
unconstitutional restrictions placed on providing legal advice. 23
The opposite outcomes are noteworthy because, as Justice Scalia
observed, the two cases equally concern government funding of
professional services: “the normal work of doctors” and “the
normal work of lawyers.” 24 Ultimately, the important takeaway
for the development of professional speech doctrine from Rust is
that the “Court did acknowledge the possibility of First
Amendment protection in this professional context.” 25
A year after Rust, the Court offered another glimpse at its
doctrinal understanding of professional speech in a famously
opaque paragraph in Casey addressing the First Amendment:
All that is left of petitioners’
argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician
not to provide information about
the risks of abortion, and childbirth,
in a manner mandated by the State.
To be sure, the physician’s First
Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated . . . but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation
by the State . . . . We see no
constitutional infirmity in the
requirement that the physician

20

Rust, 500 U.S. at 213–14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1261.
22
531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding unconstitutional restrictions on challenging existing
welfare laws).
23
See Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 683–85 (offering a parallel analysis
of Rust and Velazquez). See also PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS
253 (2013) (“The Court in Rust and Velazquez has the right idea about professional
speech, but it lacks proper language with which to express it.”).
24
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25
Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1261.
21
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provide the information mandated
by the State here. 26
The federal appellate courts are markedly split as to the
meaning of this statement. The Fourth Circuit, per Judge
Wilkinson, rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ interpretations
regarding the constitutionality of abortion regulations under the
First Amendment. 27 With respect to the paragraph in Casey,
Judge Wilkinson noted that it “does not assert that physicians
forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures
surrounding abortions, nor does it announce the proper level of
scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that compel speech
. . . .” 28 By contrast, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits had held that
Casey as well as Gonzales v. Carhart permit significant regulation
of physician speech on the topic of abortion, 29 an interpretation
that Judge Wilkinson criticized as “read[ing] too much into
Casey and Gonzales.” 30
Another site of conflict involved deceptive practices at
Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs), facilities which dispense antiabortion counseling under the guise of reproductive healthcare.
In response, California enacted the Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care and Transparency Act
(FACT Act). 31 The statute, which applied to both licensed and
unlicensed facilities, required CPCs to post certain disclosures.
Licensed facilities had to post “a notice stating the existence of
publicly-funded
family-planning
services,
including
contraception and abortion.” 32 Unlicensed facilities had to
“disseminate a notice stating that they are not licensed by the
State of California.” 33 Upon First Amendment challenge, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the FACT Act, holding the disclosures
were professional speech and properly regulated as such by the
Act. 34 The Supreme Court, however, reversed and remanded the
26

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (citations omitted).
27
See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting compelled
ultrasounds as violating the First Amendment). See also supra Part II.A.
28
Id. at 249.
29
Id. at 248–49 (citing Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., v. Rounds, 686 F.3d
889 (8th Cir. 2012); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667
F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530
F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008)).
30
Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249.
31
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West 2018).
32
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 828–29 (9th Cir.
2016), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct.
2361 (2018).
33
Harris, 839 F.3d at 829.
34
Id. at 845.
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decision, striking down the disclosure requirements as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 35 Both the Ninth
Circuit’s decision upholding the FACT Act and the Supreme
Court’s majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, contain
extensive discussions of professional speech doctrine. While the
Ninth Circuit explicitly relied on an—as I have argued, overly
expansive 36—theory of professional speech, 37 the Supreme
Court’s NIFLA majority rejected the analysis, insisting that the
Court had never recognized professional speech as a distinct
category of speech. 38
The doctrinal development of professional speech has
suffered as a result of the NIFLA litigation in at least two respects.
First, the Ninth Circuit’s broad concept of professional speech
uncoupled doctrine from theory, because “[t] he content of the
disclosures in NIFLA was too far removed from expert
knowledge to be properly attributed to the realm of professional
expertise.” 39 But professional speech must be linked to expertise
in order to achieve its distinctive goal, namely, to ensure that the
client or patient receives accurate and comprehensive advice
from the professional in accordance with the insights of the
relevant professional knowledge community. 40 Second, the
Supreme Court’s opinion may very well have been influenced by
the topic of abortion, potentially making it difficult to apply its
rationale to other areas of professional advice-giving. 41
B. Conversion Therapy Cases
Another area in which federal appellate courts have
addressed professional speech is conversion therapy. Conversion
therapy laws “prohibit licensed mental health professionals, such
as psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, psychoanalysts,
and counselors, from engaging in conversion therapy with
minors, with conversion therapy defined as practices or
treatments that seek to eliminate or reduce sexual or romantic

35

Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, supra note 3, at 189 (“In classifying the CPC
disclosures as professional speech, the Ninth Circuit defined professional speech too
broadly.”).
37
Harris, 839 F.3d at 840.
38
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (“This Court’s precedents do not recognize such a
tradition for a category called ‘professional speech.’”).
39
Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, supra note 3, at 189.
40
Id. at 195 (suggesting that “professional speech should be defined . . . as speech
that communicates a knowledge community’s insights from a professional to a client,
within a professional-client relationship, for the purpose of giving professional
advice. If speech does not fall within that definition, it should not be considered
professional speech”).
41
See infra Part IV.A.
36
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attractions or feelings towards individuals of the same sex.” 42
Notably, “[i]t was not until the late nineteenth century that
persons drawn to same-sex sex came for the first time to be seen
as having a distinctive psychological identity.” 43 Reflecting
prevailing societal attitudes “in which the dominant religion
deemed homosexuality a heinous sin, the law branded
homosexuals as criminals, and the medical profession diagnosed
homosexuals as ‘strange freaks of nature,’. . .” 44 The medical
profession, however, has since dramatically changed its
assessment. 45
In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association
declassified homosexuality as a mental illness, but it took the
medical mainstream until the 1980s to distance itself from
conversion therapy. 46 Since then, proponents of conversion
therapy have progressively migrated from the professional
mainstream to the fringe. In the end, “[f]rom the perspective of
mental health professionals, advising minors to subject
themselves to conversion therapy has become unprofessional
advice.” 47 California was the first state to prohibit conversion
therapy by licensed mental health providers for minors in 2012. 48
Several states, the District of Columbia, and a number of cities
followed. 49 Several of these laws were subsequently challenged
on the theory that they violated the First Amendment’s speech
or religion clauses.
In the development of professional speech doctrine, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pickup v. Brown 50 and the Third
Circuit’s decision in King v. Governor of New Jersey, 51 upholding
respectively the California and New Jersey conversion therapy
laws, stand out. The Ninth Circuit in Pickup articulated as an
analytical framework a speech continuum that locates a
professional’s speech in public discourse at one end, professional
speech in the professional-client relationship at the mid-point,
and professional conduct at the other end. 52 The standard of
scrutiny tracks along the continuum, highest in public discourse,
42

Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: Understanding Conversion Therapy Bans, 68
ALA. L. REV. 793, 795–96 (2017).
43
STONE, supra note 11, at xxx.
44
Id.
45
George, supra note 42, at 801–10.
46
Id. at 801.
47
Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 717.
48
George, supra note 42, at 795.
49
See Born Perfect: Laws & Legislation by State, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RTS.,
http://www.nclrights.org/bornperfect-laws-legislation-by-state/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2019) (providing a current list of conversion therapy laws).
50
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014).
51
King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
52
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–29.
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lower at the midpoint within the professional-client relationship,
and lowest when regulation governs conduct. 53 Ultimately, the
Pickup court upheld the conversion therapy law as a regulation
of professional conduct. 54
By contrast, the Third Circuit in King considered the New
Jersey conversion therapy law to govern “speech that enjoys
some degree of protection under the First Amendment.” 55
Analogizing professional speech to commercial speech, the court
noted that the “level of protection is diminished” for individuals
“speaking as state-licensed professionals within the confines of a
professional relationship.” 56 While the analogy of professional
and commercial speech for the purpose of establishing the level
of scrutiny is problematic, 57 the important takeaway here is that
the Third Circuit considered professional speech to be a category
of speech separate from commercial speech.
The Ninth Circuit in subsequent litigation also
confronted the challenge
of drawing the line between
professional and religious advice in the context of conversion
therapy. 58 As conversion therapy moved out of the mainstream,
it found its way “into evangelical politics, further reinforcing the
relationship between conversion therapy and religion.” 59 But the
Ninth Circuit upheld California’s conversion therapy law against
challenges under the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses,
reasoning that the law only concerns speech within “the confines
of the counselor-client relationship.” 60 The court explained that
“[t]he law regulates the conduct of state-licensed mental health
providers only; the conduct of all other persons, such as religious
leaders not acting as state-licensed mental health providers, is
unaffected.” 61 Further, “even the conduct of state-licensed
mental health providers is regulated only within the confines of
the counselor-client relationship; in all other areas of life, such as
religious practices, the law simply does not apply.” 62 In short, the
Ninth Circuit considered the speech within a professional-client
relationship to be subject to a different set of rules than speech
outside of that relationship, including religious speech.

53

Id.
Id. at 1222.
55
King, 767 F.3d at 224.
56
Id.
57
See Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1264–68.
58
See Welch v. Brown, 834 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2093
(2017).
59
George, supra note 42, at 801.
60
Welch, 834 F.3d at 1045.
61
Id.
62
Id.
54
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These doctrinal developments reflect both the courts’
awareness that speech within the confines of the professionalclient relationship is somehow distinctive, and the absence of a
theoretical basis to account for this distinctiveness. Indeed, some
scholars suggest that professional speech ought to be regarded as
ordinary speech. 63 The Ninth Circuit in Pickup offers perhaps the
most thoughtful theoretical discussion, though I ultimately
disagree with the court’s speech continuum theory. 64 The NIFLA
majority, by contrast, leaves largely unexplained why speech
within the professional-client relationship can be governed by a
separate doctrinal framework that includes malpractice liability
and informed consent, among other features. The lack of
theoretical engagement makes the NIFLA decision of only
limited use for lower courts grappling with questions
surrounding First Amendment protection for professional
speech. One such question concerns the conversion therapy laws
just discussed. As a doctrinal matter, commentators on NIFLA
have noted that it is now “uncertain . . . whether laws restricting
speech in order to enforce professional standards, such as
previously upheld bans on ‘conversion therapy’ for lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender people, will now be subjected to strict
scrutiny.” 65 The important question in the professional speech
context ought to be “what professional speech is scrutinized
for.” 66 If the goal of professional advice-giving is to convey
expertise, restrictions on what a professional may say—whether
or not the courts want to identify a separate category of speech—
must be measured against the knowledge community’s
insights. 67 Since the conversion therapy laws enshrine the
professional standard, they should survive any type of inquiry
that scrutinizes speech within the professional-client relationship
in light of its underlying purpose.
***
The current status of professional speech remains
contested. Most recently, the Supreme Court in NIFLA
expressed doubt as to whether professional speech is a distinctive

63

See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA.
L. REV. 67 (2016).
64
See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech and the Content-Neutrality Trap, 127 YALE
L.J. F. 150, 168 (2017) (criticizing the Pickup continuum).
65
Wendy E. Parmet et al., The Supreme Court’s Crisis Pregnancy Center Case—
Implications for Health Law, 379 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1489, 1490 (2018).
66
Haupt, supra note 64, at 171.
67
Id.
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category of speech, 68 though the decision left open that
possibility. 69 Yet a review of the doctrinal basis of professional
speech illustrates that the very question of whether it is a new
category of speech may be misguided. 70 Rather, descriptively
identifying the phenomenon is simply an acknowledgement of
the traditionally distinct doctrinal nature of professional speech
that has been implicit in the Court’s decisions at least since
Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe v. SEC. 71 Among these
unique doctrinal features are the imposition of malpractice
liability for bad advice as well as informed consent, both of
which the NIFLA majority explicitly, and without further
analysis, recognized as consistent with the First Amendment. 72
This makes the majority opinion in NIFLA theoretically
incoherent because “professional speech cannot logically be the
same as other speech, yet be governed by a different doctrinal
framework.” 73 Throughout the remainder of this Article, I will
highlight the potential implications of the NIFLA decision.
II. PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE: PROFESSION VERSUS
OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE
Historically, state involvement with the professions
emerged alongside processes of professionalization. As
disciplinary knowledge developed, states, under their police
powers, started navigating the line between regulating the
68

Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018)
(“This Court’s precedents do not recognize such a tradition for a category called
‘professional speech.’”).
69
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2375 (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has
identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category
that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the
possibility that some such reason exists.”).
70
Cf. Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1258 (“Although the Supreme Court
has never identified a category of ‘professional speech’ for First Amendment
purposes, its existence is implicit in a number of cases.”).
71
472 U.S. 181, 211–36 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Where the
personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not
purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose
circumstances he is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as
legitimate regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech;
it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First
Amendment's command that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press.’”). Others go back even further in identifying the origins of
professional speech doctrine. See, e.g., Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708
F.3d 560, 568 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
72
Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (discussing “[l]ongstanding torts for professional
malpractice” and characterizing informed consent as “firmly entrenched in
American tort law”).
73
Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, supra note 3, at 189.
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profession and regulating professional speech. 74 Licensing
regimes, for example, frequently emerged in cooperation with
the professions. 75 But sometimes, the dissemination of emergent
disciplinary knowledge was quashed by state interference before
it could fully develop.
During the Second Great Awakening, “Charles
Knowlton, a Massachusetts physician, published Fruits of
Philosophy; or, The Private Companion of Young Married People, a
path-breaking work that ‘attempted to apply science to sexual
relations.’ Knowlton argued that people’s understanding of sex
and sexuality must move into the realm of medicine.” 76 This
effort, however, was cut short by state intervention. “Knowlton
was sentenced to hard labor by a Massachusetts court, which
took the evangelical line and officially declared all books
discussing contraception, even those written by physicians in a
medical manner, morally unacceptable.” 77 Indeed, “the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, invoking the still-nascent
doctrine of obscenity, repeatedly prosecuted Knowlton for The
Fruits of Philosophy, even though the text was clearly intended to
convey health information about birth control in a responsible
and thoughtful manner.” 78
The federal Comstock Act equally functioned to restrict
the dissemination of emergent expert knowledge, as illustrated
by the prosecution in 1876 of public health advocate Dr. Edward
Bliss Foote. His “popular home guide, Plain Home Talk About the
Human System, served a large and eager medical-advice market
by providing clear and practical information about sex and
contraception. . . .” 79 Nonetheless, “Foote was prosecuted and
convicted for distributing information about contraception. The
presiding judge ruled that medical advice was not exempt from
the statutory prohibition.” 80
Today, external interference—primarily by state
legislatures—equally occurs in the reproductive health context,
and it tends to largely contradict professional knowledge. 81 This
74

See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228–29 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the
result).
75
Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, supra note 4, at 8 (discussing emergent professions’
“calls for state intervention to establish admissions regulations, or licensing
regimes”).
76
STONE, supra note 11, at 146–47.
77
Id. at 147.
78
Id. at 182–83.
79
Id. at 160.
80
Id.
81
See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Planned
Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 (8th Cir. 2012)
(upholding a state law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking an abortion of an
increased risk of suicide to obtain informed consent). See also Rick Rojas, Arizona
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Part discusses those laws that contradict an existing professional
standard before turning to contestation of professional
knowledge within the profession and its relation to state
interference. The key question is how the state should account
for internal professional disagreement around expert knowledge.
A. External Interference
Perhaps the most prominent examples of government
interference at odds with professional insights come from the
reproductive rights context. State legislatures are increasingly
chipping away at the fundamental right to choose articulated in
Roe v. Wade 82 and reaffirmed in Casey. 83 As part of this process,
various states have passed laws requiring professionals to advise
patients in a manner inconsistent with professional insights.
The Eighth Circuit, for example, upheld a South Dakota
informed consent statute that requires abortion providers to warn
against an alleged increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide,
inconsistent with medical knowledge. 84 A panel of the Eighth
Circuit held the suicide advisory unconstitutional under the First
Amendment as “compelling untruthful and misleading speech,”
and thereby “violat[ing] doctors’ First Amendment right to be
free from compelled speech that is untruthful, misleading, or
irrelevant.” 85 Upon en banc review limited to the issue of the
suicide advisory, the Eighth Circuit reversed. Relying on
Gonzales v. Carhart, 86 the plurality emphasized the state’s ability
to compel the disclosure even in the face of “medical and
scientific uncertainty.” 87 Two separate concurrences, however,
indicate that the physician may still exercise individual
professional judgment in either tailoring the disclosure itself 88 or
supplementing the disclosure, 89 thereby granting “somewhat
more weight to professional knowledge and deference to the
Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversible, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31,
2015), http://nyti.ms/1DpDo0Q (“Arizona . . . became the first state to pass a law
requiring doctors who perform drug-induced abortions to tell women that the
procedure may be reversible, an assertion that most doctors say is wrong.”).
82
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
84
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 686 F.3d 889,
892 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii)
(2015)).
85
Planned Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D v. Rounds (Rounds I), 653 F.3d 662, 673
(8th Cir. 2011).
86
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
87
Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 904.
88
Id. at 906 (Loken, J., concurring) (interpreting the decision to “require only a
disclosure as to relative risk that the physician can adapt to fit his or her professional
opinion of the conflicting medical research on this contentious subject”).
89
Id. at 907 (Colloton, J., concurring) (suggesting that “the physician [is] free to
augment that description based on his or her professional judgment”).
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individual professional.” 90 Critics suggest that “a more robust
First Amendment inquiry” in this case would have focused on
“ensuring clinically and professionally appropriate speech within
the doctor-patient relationship.” 91 Indeed, such an inquiry would
have required “the judge . . . to determine whether the knowledge
community’s insights are being communicated.” 92
The Fourth Circuit struck down a North Carolina statute
that required mandatory sonograms as unconstitutional under
the First Amendment—on the reasoning that, while truthful, it
is up to the professional to decide whether or when the
information conveyed is relevant 93—whereas the Fifth Circuit
upheld a similar Texas law. 94 Other examples from the
reproductive rights context include an ultimately unsuccessful
effort by Arizona to require advice that medication abortion is
reversible. 95
Taken together, these opinions show that, when
confronted with legislative interference into professional advice
that contradicts professional knowledge, courts have a mixed
record. Especially in the reproductive rights arena, outcomes are
inconsistent. In the context of conversion therapy legislation, by
contrast, courts have signaled more willingness to defer to
professional consensus. 96
B. Internal Contestation
Conversion therapy and reproductive health provide
useful illustrations of internal contestation in light of emergent
90

Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1298.
Recent Case, First Amendment—Compelled Speech—Eighth Circuit Applies Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey to South Dakota “Suicide
Advisory”—Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1438, 1438
(2013).
92
Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1299.
93
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 254 (4th Cir. 2014).
94
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir.
2012).
95
Federal District Court Ends Legal Challenge to Unconstitutional Arizona Law Forcing
Doctors to Lie to Women, Ensuring Law Will Never Take Effect, CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RTS., (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/federaldistrict-court-ends-legal-challenge-to-unconstitutional-arizona-law-forcing-doctors-tolie-to-women; Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. et al. v. Brnovich, Christ, et al., CTR. FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RTS, https://www.reproductiverights.org/case/planned-parenthoodarizona-inc-et-al-v-brnovich-christ-et-al (last revised July 20, 2018).
96
The Eleventh Circuit likewise signaled deference to the professional standard when
it held a Florida statute prohibiting doctors to inquire about gun ownership as a
matter of course unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Wollschlaeger v.
Governor of Fla. 848 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). In this case, however, the
court displayed considerable ambiguity when choosing its ultimate rationale. Haupt,
supra note 64, at 151 (noting that “a three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit issued
three consecutive, contradictory decisions” before “the court handed down an en
banc decision that offers yet another analysis. . . .”).
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or changing knowledge upon which professionals base their
advice. Here, too, historical antecedents exist. Professional
knowledge is neither static nor monolithic, and professional
insights change over time. This is true both for scientific insights
as well as professional groups’ positions on individual issues.
Contrast the role of the American Psychiatric Association and its
declassification of homosexuality as a mental disorder 97 with the
American Medical Association’s early anti-abortion advocacy. 98
Both areas also have an additional challenge in their religious
salience that may at times be difficult to separate out from
matters of expertise.
The internal professional developments that form the
backdrop of contemporary conversion therapy legislation
illustrate how professional knowledge leaves the mainstream,
becoming so discredited that a professional consensus forms
against it. This trend within the profession has been reflected in
the courts. Consider, for example, the exclusion of expert
testimony in a conversion therapy case, Ferguson et al. v. JONAH,
Jews Offering New Alternatives for Healing (“JONAH” f/k/a
Jews Offering New Alternatives to Homosexuality) where “a
New Jersey court, after jury trial, found conversion therapy
providers to be engaged in consumer fraud.” 99 During the trial,
the court excluded a number of expert witnesses who were to
testify on the benefits of conversion therapy. 100 Plaintiffs in that
case relied on the American Psychiatric Association’s 1973
removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
and argued “because the belief that homosexuality is a mental
disorder is false and lacks any basis in science, any expert
opinion derived from that false initial premise is unreliable and
should be excluded.” 101 JONAH, however, argued that “reliance
on the DSM is misplaced because the removal of homosexuality
was a political, rather than scientific, decision.” 102 The judge,
excluding the pro-conversion therapy witnesses, noted “[t]he
overwhelming weight of scientific authority concludes that
homosexuality is not a disorder or abnormal. The universal
acceptance of that scientific conclusion—save for outliers such
97

See discussion supra Part I.B.; George, supra note 42.
STONE, supra note 11, at 187–89. See also Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A
Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261, 280–318 (1992).
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Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 718.
100
Ferguson v. JONAH, No. HUD-L-5473-12, 2015 WL 609436, at *9 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2015) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to bar five of JONAH’s
experts and partially granting their motion to bar the sixth).
101
Id. at *4.
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Id. at *5.
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as JONAH—requires that any expert opinions to the contrary
must be barred.” 103 Whether the reasons for changing the DSM
were scientific or political, moreover, is not for the court to
decide. 104 Likewise, it is not for the court to decide on the
accuracy of the professional community’s assessment. 105 In
short, the court’s assessment of internal contestation follows the
profession.
By contrast, in the reproductive rights context the courts’
response to internal contestation is instructive because at times it
seems to take the opposite approach. Take the “partial birth”
abortion cases, Stenberg v. Carhart 106 and Gonzales v. Carhart, 107 as
an example. Aziza Ahmed has carefully charted the shifts in the
jurisprudential treatment of expertise in the abortion context. 108
Comparing the Stenberg and Gonzales decisions, Ahmed notes
that both concerned “nearly identical evidence and expertise,”
but resulted in opposing outcomes. 109 This raises questions about
“how medical experts with conflicting opinions legitimate
themselves through participating in adjudication, and how
medical expertise and evidence constrains judicial decisionmaking.” 110 The Court in Stenberg was faced with medical
questions that were unresolved as a matter of professional
knowledge regarding certain procedures and their associated
risks. Thus, the Court confronted “numerous competing sources
of opinion, each deemed to be medically and scientifically
authoritative, but providing differing advice, guidance, and
103

Id. at *6.
Id. at *8 (quoting Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 414 (1992)) (noting
that “a trial court should not substitute its judgment for that of the relevant scientific
community.”).
105
Id. (“It is not a proper inquiry for a court to determine the correctness of the
APA’s decision to generally accept that homosexuality is not a disorder, and no
proper basis has been advanced on which a court may reassess the scientific accuracy
of the psychiatric categorization of homosexuality.”).
106
530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down Nebraska statute prohibiting “partial birth
abortion”).
107
550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act).
108
See Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion Jurisprudence, 41 AM. J.
L. & MED. 85 (2015). Outlining a shift over time, Ahmed notes: “In Roe and Casey,
where the Court portrayed the medical establishment as objective and neutral, the
Justices were able to defer to medical expertise and evidence. In the post-Stenberg
context, however . . . judges must now arbitrate medical evidence and expertise.” Id.
at 106.
109
Id. at 88.
110
Id. There are several larger themes at issue—especially the question of objectivity
of scientific insights looms large. For purposes of this discussion, however, I will
focus on the distinct problem of indeterminacy or contestation within the
professional knowledge community and the state’s role (here embodied by the
courts) to resolve the issue. Id. at 88–89. See also Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, supra
note 4, at 28–35 (discussing epistemology of scientific knowledge in the sociology of
the professions literature).
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knowledge on the actual procedure.” 111 As Ahmed puts it, “[i]n
the face of conflicting data, the Court became an arbiter of
medical and health knowledge.” 112 Importantly, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that expert opinion was divided; “[t]his
explicit acknowledgement of a divided body of literature is
important as we approach Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Court
cited to non-medical anecdotal evidence partly due to a
perceived lack of clarity amongst medical experts.” 113
Stone explains this dynamic with respect to the justices’
reasoning in Gonzales v. Carhart. Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion acknowledged “that medical opinion was divided on
whether intact D&E abortions might be safer for some women
in some circumstances,” but “Kennedy noted that Congress had
made a finding in enacting the challenged legislation that partialbirth abortion ‘is never medically necessary.’” 114 Thus, the
majority deferred to Congress regarding the internal conflict,
rather than the profession. In other words, the Court here
intervened in an internal dispute of the relevant professional
knowledge community, picking winners and losers by deferring
to congressional judgment which did the same.
The dissent by Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, criticized this deference to Congress
on a contested professional matter. Reliance on congressional
findings inconsistent with professional knowledge, she noted,
was inappropriate. Stone recounts “Ginsburg insisted that the
congressional finding relied upon by the majority could not
‘withstand inspection.’ To the contrary, she . . . concluded,
Congress’s bare assertion that ‘there was a medical consensus
that the banned procedure is never necessary” was completely
inconsistent with the . . . facts.’” 115 In the end, the case thus not
only disregards contestation within the knowledge community,
but also enshrines an erroneous interpretation of medical
knowledge into legal doctrine.
The Court’s differential treatment of expertise raises
several larger questions relevant to professional speech. Among
them are: deference to whom and deference for what? 116 Stone’s
discussion of Gonzales v. Carhart highlights the misguided
111

Ahmed, supra note 108, at 99.
Id. at 99–100
113
Id. at 101.
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STONE, supra note 11, at 426 (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 161, 164 (2007)).
115
Id. (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171–76 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)).
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Cf. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Sex and Religion: Unholy Bedfellows, 116 MICH. L. REV.
859, 876 (2018) (noting the importance of deference for the outcome of the cases
Stone discusses).
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deference to medical expertise as interpreted by Congress; the
Court appropriately should have deferred to the knowledge
community’s expertise as interpreted by the profession. And, as
illustrated in the discussion of Rounds, the suicide advisory case,
the Eighth Circuit has taken the misguided approach in Gonzales
v. Carhart as permission to uphold a statute that disregards even
broader consensus in the medical community. 117 In order to
ensure the accuracy of professional expertise, however, other
experts—rather than legislators or judges—should be the arbiters
of its content.
C. Client/Patient Perspective
From the perspective of the client or patient, the
importance of safeguarding professional knowledge against
outside interference that contradicts professional insights comes
into sharp relief. The client or patient must rely on professional
advice. The premise of the professional-client or doctor-patient
relationship is that the professional has knowledge that the client
or patient lacks. The fiduciary relationship between them
demands that the professional gives comprehensive and accurate
advice.
By interfering, the state injects its authority into this
relationship. When legislation aligns with professional insights,
as in the conversion therapy example, state involvement is
relatively unproblematic, though even here it is important to
reiterate that professional insights are neither monolithic nor
static. 118 The state ought not choose one approach if the
professional consensus allows several. Nor should the state halt
innovation. 119 But much more serious problems arise when state
interference contradicts professional insights, as in the
reproductive health examples. Here, the fundamental premise of
the professional relationship—based on giving comprehensive
and accurate advice—is in jeopardy. 120
To be sure, the states have an interest in regulating
citizens’ health and welfare via the police powers. But the site of
expertise lies with the profession, so the content of accurate and
comprehensive advice must be determined by the profession, as
the malpractice liability regime has traditionally recognized.
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See supra Part II.A.
Haupt, Professional Speech, supra note 1, at 1294–95.
119
Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 721.
120
Id. at 691. The same applies to the Florida gun case, discussed supra note 96. See
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. 848 F.3d 1293.
118

205

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

III. INDIVIDUAL PERSPECTIVE: PROFESSIONAL VERSUS
PROFESSION
Another site of potential conflict lies in the relationship
between the individual professional who departs from the
professional consensus on the one hand, and the profession on
the other hand. 121 This could be the pro-conversion therapy
therapist, the anti-vaccine doctor, or the pharmacist who refuses
to dispense birth control medication they believe to be
abortifacients. But this could also be the doctor who believes
marijuana is medically beneficial, or the doctor who finds
mammograms useless. 122
A. Professional Outliers
When considering professional outliers, that is,
individual professionals who depart from the professional
consensus, it is useful to identify the basis upon which they
justify their departure. 123 Outliers who use the shared
methodology of the profession to justify their departure (internal
outliers) should be considered part of the discourse of the
profession. These professionals, in fact, could be the particularly
innovative individuals ahead of the curve whose insights
subsequently are embraced by a wider professional consensus. 124
The shifting views regarding the benefits of medical marijuana
serve as a prime example. 125 Alternatively, these outliers’ views
could be tested and refuted by the profession; here, the refuted
link between certain childhood vaccines and autism is a useful
example. 126 Outliers who use exogenous justifications for
departure (external outliers), however, place themselves outside
of the professional discourse that assumes shared ways of
121

I use the term “consensus” to mean “agreement relative to the relevant knowledge
community.” See Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 675 n.14. See also
Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV.
1723, 1741 (2015) (“[T]he argument is not that science has been able to access
unvarnished truth, but rather that relevant scientific communities have been able to
set aside all theoretical and methodological disagreements to come together on a
shared position. If most or all members of the relevant thought collective are in
agreement, then that collective judgment surely demands a high degree of respect
from society in general and the law more particularly.”).
122
See Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 672–73.
123
Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 676; Haupt, Religious Outliers, supra
note 13, at 179–85.
124
Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, supra note 2, at 690 (“To the extent that a
professional’s outlier status is grounded in disagreement based on shared notions of
validity, departure from the knowledge community’s insights must be permissible.
Indeed, dynamic development and refinement of professional insights will often
depend on such divergent assessments.”).
125
Id. at 721–24.
126
Id. at 715–16.
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knowing and reasoning. 127 Typically, religious, philosophical, or
political disagreement with the profession creates external
outliers. 128 Most prominently among them are healthcare
professionals who invoke religious disagreement with
professional standards and justify their departure from the
professional standard accordingly.
Importantly, however, there is a line between expertise
and moral or value judgments where no special claim to
expertise exists. 129 As I have explained elsewhere, “professional
determinations based on medical expertise can be made
regarding the total and irreversible cessation of all brain
functions (‘brain death’) and its diagnostic criteria.” 130 But “it is
a value judgment whether this medical diagnosis constitutes the
end of life of the individual; this is a matter with ethical,
philosophical, and religious dimensions beyond medical
expertise.” 131 Similar questions regarding the limits of
professional expertise may arise in the abortion context. To be
sure, this line between expertise and moral or value judgment
can be quite elusive at times. Some emergent reproductive rights
controversies will likely fall in this area where the underlying
science is evolving, but moral disagreement persists. 132
B. Government Endorsement of Outlier Status
There are various ways in which the state can endorse or
reinforce professional outlier status of individual professionals
against the profession. Most notably, such endorsement may

127

Id. at 690 (explaining that “outlier status based on exogenous reasons undermines
the status of the professional as a member of the knowledge community founded in
shared notions of validity and common ways of knowing and reasoning”).
128
Id. at 672.
129
Haupt, Religious Outliers, supra note 13, at 177 (“The knowledge community has a
superior understanding of issues directly related to its core knowledge. But no
amount of specialized training, for instance, by itself makes a professional more
competent to render general value judgments on moral issues unrelated or only
tangentially related to professional insights.”).
130
Haupt, Religious Outliers, supra note 13, at 177.
131
Id.
132
See, e.g., Chelsea Conaboy, The Abortion Debate Doesn’t Change, But the Science of
Abortion Does, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2018/08/31/the-abortion-debate-doesnchange-but-science-abortion-does/smHRPvw5XDkTXzMUrADawK/story.html;
Emma Green, Science Is Giving the Pro-Life Movement a Boost, ATLANTIC (Jan. 18,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/pro-life-proscience/549308/.
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come in the form of religious exemptions. 133 Another way to
frame the issue is to consider how the government may insulate
dissenters. 134
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
has created a “Conscience and Religious Freedom Division”
that “was established to hear complaints from medical
professionals . . . who feel they have been pressured into
providing medical services that conflict with their religious
beliefs.” 135 Based on newly issued regulations, HHS can “enforce
protections for religious medical providers.” 136 In effect, this
results in state enforcement of individual professionals’ outlier
status against the profession. Whether such government
involvement in the profession’s arguably internal affairs is
justified depends on the extent to which departure from the
professional consensus for personal reasons ought to be
permissible. Importantly, the profession typically will
accommodate its members to a certain extent. The American
Medical Association, for instance, in Opinion 1.1.7 addresses
“Physician Exercise of Conscience.” 137 It is worth considering
whether the fundamental decision in favor of certain selfregulating professions—justified on the idea of respecting the
locus of expertise within the profession—warrants granting a
large degree of autonomy to the profession in deciding to what
extent departure from professional knowledge ought to be
permissible. The perspective of the client or patient to whom the
professional owes a fiduciary duty should guide the appropriate
answer.
C. Client/Patient Perspective
From the client’s or patient’s perspective, receiving
limited advice constricts the otherwise available range of options
among which to choose. Indeed, the client or patient has a strong
133

Here, I do not use “endorsement” in the technical sense of the Establishment
Clause. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
772 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the endorsement test); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (same). However,
some forms of religious exemptions might raise Establishment Clause questions. See
Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims
in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2529 (2015) (“Under the Establishment
Clause, the Court has invalidated accommodations that impose ‘significant burdens’
on third parties.”).
134
Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change:
What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions, 48
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703 (2014).
135
Olga Khazan, When The Religious Doctor Refuses to Treat You, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/01/when-the-religiousdoctor-refuses-to-treat-you/551231/.
136
Id.
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CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 1.1.7 (AMA 2016).
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autonomy interest that the professional’s fiduciary obligations,
as well as the imposition of informed consent requirements,
protect. The ultimate decision, in short, has to remain with the
client or patient. In order to make a fully informed choice,
however, the patient should know what is being withheld. To
achieve this, scholars offer various solutions. Nadia Sawicki has
proposed a common law duty to disclose limitations. 138
Similarly, I have suggested that full advice also means advising
on what is left out. 139 These approaches acknowledge that the
client or patient has an important interest in receiving
comprehensive professional advice.
IV. FUTURE SITES OF CONFLICT
To illustrate how themes of sex, gender, sexual
orientation and religion continue to play a role in the
professional speech context, this Part focuses on two likely future
sites of conflict. The first concerns the continuing contestation
over reproductive rights. Between the Supreme Court decisions
in NIFLA 140 and Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 141 new fault
lines emerge that implicate the interaction between professional
advice and state activities in seeking to limit access to abortion.
The second area of likely future conflict involves transgender
healthcare. Here, professional standards are beginning to
emerge. At the same time, however, state interference is
becoming increasingly probable.
A. Reproductive Rights
With respect to the content of advice, a shift has taken
place between the “partial birth” abortion decisions 142 and Whole
Women’s Health. 143 Whereas the Court relied on questionable
assumptions in the former set of cases, it deferred much more
clearly to scientific evidence in the latter. States increasingly
moved to protecting women’s health as a justification for
imposing limits on access to abortion. 144 In Whole Women’s
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See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, A Common Law Duty to Disclose Conscience-Based
Limitations on Medical Practice, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATES 187 (Holly F. Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds., 2017).
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Haupt, Religious Outliers, supra note 13.
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138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Gonzales v. Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914
(2000).
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136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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See generally Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings:
When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428 (2016).
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Health, however, the Court closely hewed to scientific insights in
evaluating these justifications. 145
Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel explain that the
Court’s approach in Whole Woman’s Health “closely scrutinizes
scientific evidence marshaled by opposing parties.” The type of
“[e]vidence-based balancing” displayed in the decision has
significant impact on the lower courts’ approaches to a range of
“health-justified
restrictions
on
abortion,”
including
“scientifically inaccurate warnings that abortion causes breast
cancer,” state laws that, contrary to scientific insights, “requir[e]
abortion providers to inform women that they are more likely to
experience psychological harm if they obtain abortions than if
they carry their unplanned pregnancies to term,” and “abortion
restrictions that rest on contested factual claims—for example,
claims that abortion before viability inflicts fetal pain.” 146
The NIFLA decision, however, has arguably unsettled the
regulation of abortion-related speech more generally. As
commentators note, the decision “raises the troubling possibility
that the courts may be more apt to apply the informed-consent
exception to laws that regulate the speech of abortion providers
than to those that regulate the speech of abortion opponents.” 147
In light of the unequal treatment for abortion-related speech that
had been found to exist prior to NIFLA, 148 one question is
“whether this unequal application of the First Amendment will
continue after NIFLA or whether the courts will now apply strict
scrutiny more broadly to all regulations of abortion-related
speech, including state laws that require abortion providers to
give patients medically inaccurate information.” 149
With respect to controversy around the “domestic gag
rule,” 150 the problem is giving comprehensive professional
advice. As such, the contestation is similar to that surrounding
Rust v. Sullivan and, in the legal context, Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez. 151 In response to the HHS announcement of the final
145

See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes:
Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J. F. 149
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U.S. 533 (2001). See also supra Part I–I.A.
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rule limiting Title X funding, 152 the AMA has expressed deep
concern regarding the new regulation’s impact on access to
comprehensive healthcare. The AMA’s position is that the
regulation “would limit women’s access to care and force doctors
to withhold information about all of their health care options.” 153
In addition to interfering with the doctor-patient advice-giving
relationship, the AMA argues that the new rule will force
physicians into a conflict with the professional code of ethics. 154
B. Transgender Healthcare
As transgender healthcare moves into the mainstream of
healthcare service delivery, 155 the dynamics of internal
contestation and outside interference will likely become more
apparent in this area. Standards of care are in the process of
development; the content of good professional advice is still in
its formation stages. 156 Moreover, medical education is only
starting to incorporate trans healthcare into the curriculum. 157
The American Academy of Pediatrics, for example, released a
new policy statement regarding healthcare for transgender and
gender diverse children and adolescents in September 2018. 158
At the same time, state involvement in this area is
becoming more likely. According to news reports, the Trump
administration is in the process of redefining “gender” under
federal civil rights law. HHS in particular is reportedly drafting a
memo arguing that “[s]ex means a person’s status as male or
female based on immutable biological traits identifiable by or
152
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before birth. . . The sex listed on a person’s birth certificate, as
originally issued, shall constitute definitive proof of a person’s
sex unless rebutted by reliable genetic evidence.” 159 One area
acutely affected by such a change is the Affordable Care Act’s
prohibition of sex discrimination by providers, which courts
have interpreted to include gender-identity discrimination. 160
Commentators note that the contemplated change “would be
tragic not just for patients, but for the health care profession as
well.” 161 The ACA provision, they suggest, provides guidance to
patients and providers, “and it has been welcomed by physician
groups such as the American Medical Association.” 162 The HHS
memo, by contrast, not only contradicts court decisions on
gender-identity discrimination but also takes away important
legal guidance for providers. 163 Moreover, the HHS memo’s
definitional interference contradicts expert knowledge—or at the
very least obscures internal contestation. 164
In addition, the HHS conscience and religious freedom
directive 165 may permit providers to opt out of educational
requirements concerning sexual and gender minority
healthcare. 166 Notably, educators have found “[a]ppeals to
professional competence—the ability to care for any person who
walks through the practice’s doors” to be successful when
confronted with providers who were ambivalent based on
“personal, cultural, or religious views about sexual orientation
or gender identity.” 167 Thus, it seems that as professional
knowledge in this area develops, conflicts along the lines of
profession versus outside interference as well as professional
versus profession are likely.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the most part, the advice clients and patients receive from
their professionals is uncontroversial. Thus, state legislatures will
not likely find reason to intervene when the subject of advicegiving concerns broken bones, damaged joints, or torn ligaments.
The expertise clients and patients seek will be provided within a
regulatory framework that ensures professionals are qualified
and provide accurate and comprehensive advice according to the
insights of the profession. Of course, Justice Thomas in NIFLA
is right to note that professional malpractice liability and
informed consent are firmly entrenched in American law. 168
Nonetheless, this does not negate the need for a theoretical basis.
Yet, the underlying contestation over sex, gender, sexual
orientation, and religion explains why professional speech
doctrine itself may sometimes be controversial.
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